We develop median statistics that provide powerful alternatives to χ 2 likelihood methods and require fewer assumptions about the data. Application to astronomical data demonstrates that median statistics lead to results that are quite similar and almost as constraining as χ 2 likelihood methods, but with somewhat more confidence since they do not assume Gaussianity of the errors or that their magnitudes are known.
Introduction
Statistics that require the fewest assumptions about the data are often the most useful. Gott & Turner (1977 , also see Gott 1978 used median mass-to-light ratios for groups of galaxies in comparing with N-body simulations to estimate Ω M . Median mass-to-light ratios were preferable to mean mass-to-light ratios because they were less sensitive to the effects of background contamination and unlucky projection effects. At the IAU meeting in Tallinn, Estonia, Ya. B. Zeldovich commented on this choice. He noted that in Russia some watches were not made very well, so when three friends meet they compare the times on their watches -one says "it's 1 o'clock", the second says, "it's 5 minutes after 1," the third says "it's 5 o'clock". Take the median! Perhaps no one has ever stated the benefits of the median over the mean better than Zeldovich 4 . In this paper we develop median statistics and apply them to high-redshift SNe Ia apparent magnitude versus redshift data which recently provided evidence for an accelerating universe. We also apply these statistics to estimates of the Hubble constant and the mass of Pluto.
The usual hypotheses made when using data in a χ 2 analysis are that (1) individual data points are statistically independent, (2) there are no systematic effects, (3) the errors are Gaussianly distributed, and (4) one knows the standard deviation of these errors. These are four extraordinarily potent hypotheses, which lead to powerful results if the four conditions are indeed true. We will show that even the first two conditions alone can lead to powerful results -allowing us to drop the third and fourth conditions 5 rely on the important assumption that the errors are normally distributed, as is apparent in their derivation of confidence limits in their χ 2 analyses. This is a somewhat troubling assumption since the errors in corrected supernovae luminosities are not likely Gaussianly distributed. While there seems to be a rather strong upper limit on supernovae luminosities, there seems to be a longer low luminosity tail (Höflich et al. 1996 ). This does not directly imply that the errors in the corrected supernovae luminosities are non-Gaussian, but does indicate that the population of supernovae could include outliers in the luminosity distribution that are not as well-calibrated by the training set. This is related to the possible concern that, when corrected supernovae luminosities are calculated using a training set of order the same size (roughly two dozen for the R98 MLCS method) as the data set to be corrected, one can never be sure that one is not encountering some supernovae that are odd and do not fit the training set.
The limits of assuming a normal distribution are illustrated by a penguin parable adapted from a discussion by Hill (1992) . Suppose one measured the weights of a million adult penguins and found them to have a mean weight of 100 lbs with a standard deviation of 10 lbs. Further suppose that the observed data's distribution fits a Gaussian distribution perfectly. Of the million penguins measured, suppose that, consistent with a Gaussian distribution, the heaviest one weighs 147.5 lbs. What is the probability of encountering, on measuring the next adult penguin, a penguin weighing more than 200 lbs? One might be tempted to say that it was P = 10 −23 , by simply fitting the normal distribution and calculating the probability of obtaining an upward 10 σ fluctuation. But this would be wrong. There could be a second species of penguin, all of whose adults weighed over 200 lbs which simply had a population a million times smaller, so that one had not encountered one yet. In this case, the probability of encountering a penguin weighing over 200 lbs is 10 −6 . Even data that fits a normal distribution perfectly cannot be used to extend the range beyond that of the data itself. The correct answer, suggested by Hill's (1992) argument, which does not depend on assumption (3), is that the probability that the 1,000,001st penguin weighs more than any of the million penguins measured so far is simply P = 1/1, 000, 001. This is according to hypothesis (1) that all the data points are independent. A priori, each of the 1,000,001 penguins must have an equal chance (1/1, 000, 001) of being the heaviest one. Thus, the last one must have a probability of 1/1, 000, 001 of weighing over 147.5 lbs. Beyond that, the data do not say anything. This may be relevant in the supernova case. Using a training set of a little more than two dozen supernovae to correct 16 distant supernovae, one might encounter a distant supernova that goes beyond the training set, in other words, one that is odd. Indeed, supernovae classifications like Ia pec, as well as Arp's famous catalog of peculiar galaxies, are warnings that in astronomy one does encounter peculiar objects as rare events. If we fail to recognize them as a separate class, we may unduly pollute a mean indicator -another reason for using median statistics, which make no assumptions about the distribution and which are less influenced by such outliers. Clearly, given sufficient information about a penguin (supernova), we should be able to identify it as a different species (supernova class) and thereby avoid skewing the results. Our concern is what happens when the information is not sufficient.
When Gaussian errors are assumed, one of the great benefits is that the errors decrease as N −1/2 , where N is the number of measurements. Thus, with the 16 high-redshift R98 supernovae one can get estimates of Ω M and Ω Λ that are 4 times as accurate as with a single measurement. In this paper we show how median statistics takes advantage of a similar N −1/2 factor to produce accurate results, even while not relying on hypotheses (3) and (4) that the errors are Gaussian with known standard deviation. Indeed, as we shall show, hypotheses (1) and (2) are sufficiently powerful by themselves to produce results that are only slightly less constraining than those from χ 2 analyses that also assume hypotheses (3) and (4), but in which we may have more confidence because two significant and perhaps questionable assumptions have been dropped.
In Section 2 we outline how median statistics can be used with N estimates, which we illustrate with examples from the Cauchy distribution and another look at the penguin problem. We apply our methods to estimates of the Hubble constant in Section 3 and to estimates of the mass of Pluto in Section 4. In Section 5 we perform a simple binomial analysis of the 16 high-redshift R98 SNe Ia measurements. In Section 6 we present a more complete Bayesian analysis of these data. Constraints on Ω M and Ω Λ from the larger P99 data set are discussed in Section 7. Section 8 discusses median statistics SNe Ia constraints on a time-variable Λ. In Section 9 we summarize our conclusions.
Median statistics
We assume hypotheses (1) and (2), that our measurements of a given quantity are independent and that there are no systematic effects. Suppose we were to take a large finite number of measurements. We will then assume -call this related hypothesis (2a) -that the median value thus obtained as the number N of measurements tends to infinity will be the true value. We are thus excluding some "complex" distributions, e.g., a symmetric double hatbox model with a gap in the middle. The accuracy of hypothesis (2a) may be limited by discreteness in the measurements that prevents the data set from including the true median (see section 3 for an example of this problem, in which we analyze the Hubble constant data, which are tabulated as integer values). An extreme example of discreteness would be the case of a sample of numbers generated by coin flips in which heads = 1 and tails = 0. If we obtain 49 1's and 51 0's, then the median is 0 but the 95% confidence limits must include both 0 and 1.
If we make a large number of measurements and there are no systematic effects we might naturally expect half to be above the true value and half to be below the true value. So we will suppose that after some very large number of measurements, as N tends to infinity, there would be a true median (TM). Now by hypothesis (1) each individual measurement will be statistically independent, thus, each has a 50% chance to be above or below TM. Suppose we make N independent measurements M i where i = 1, ..., N . Where is TM likely to be? The probability that exactly n of the N measurements are higher than TM is given by the binomial distribution,
because there is a 50% chance that each measurement is higher than TM and they are independent.
Thus, if we have taken N measurements M i and these are later ranked by value such that M j > M i if j > i, then the probability that the true median TM lies between M i and M i+1 is
where we set M 0 = −∞ and M N +1 = +∞. For example, if N = 16, our confidence that TM lies between M 8 and M 9 is 19.6%. Importantly, the distribution of TM is much narrower that the distribution of the measurements themselves. For comparison the probability that the next individual measurement we take will lie between M i and M i+1 is just
If we set r = i/N we can define M (r) = M i . Then the distribution width can be defined by the variable r. Any measurement m may be associated with a value r by the inverse function r(m) such that M (r) = m with suitable interpolation applied. In the limit of large N we find that the expectation value of r for the next measurement m is r = 0.5 and its standard deviation is r 2 − r 2 1/2 = 1/(12) 1/2 (since the distribution is uniform in r over the interval 0 to 1). On the other hand, in the limit of large N the expectation value of r for TM is r = 0.5 and its standard deviation is r 2 − r 2 1/2 = 1/(4N ) 1/2 (in fact, in the limit of large N the distribution in r approaches a Gaussian distribution with the above mean and standard deviation). Thus, as we take more measurements we see that the standard deviation in r of the TM is proportional to N −1/2 . If we use median statistics, we find that our precision in determining TM (as measured by the percentile r in the distribution of measurements) improves like N −1/2 as N grows larger. Thus, median statistics achieves the factor of N 1/2 improvement with sample size that we expect from mean Gaussian statistics.
Statistics of samples drawn from a Cauchy distribution illustrate the robustness of the median for even a pathological parent population. If θ is a uniform random variable in the range from −π/2 to +π/2, then the probability distribution function of x = x 0 + tan θ is a Cauchy distribution,
. This is a distribution with infinite variance, thus samples from this parent population are plagued by extreme outliers. However, the median is quite well-behaved and the uncertainty in the median, unlike the variance, is appropriately narrow. As an example, we generate a sample of 101 uniform random values of θ, then compute the statistics of the set {x i }, i = 1, ..., 101 where x = 5 + tan θ. Using standard formulae we find that the mean of our sample is x = 9.58, the standard deviation is σ x = 54.8, and the standard deviation of the mean is σ x = 5.45, thus the 95% confidence limits on the mean are −0.32 < x < 19.48. For comparison, the median of this sample is x med = 4.818 and the 95% confidence limits on the true median, following eq. (1), are 4.41 < x T M < 5.11. The median is nearly immune to the "outliers" in our test sample, which included x = −35.17 and x = 552.57.
Let us apply median statistics to the previously mentioned penguin problem. Suppose we measure the mass of 1,000,000 penguins and find that they follow a normal distribution with a mean of 100 lbs and a standard deviation of 10 lbs. Thus we have mean = 100 lbs
and applying the standard formula the standard deviation of the mean is σ mean = 10 lbs/(999, 999) 1/2 = 0.01 lbs.
We would hence deduce with 95% (2 σ) confidence that the true mean for the population of penguins lies between 99.98 and 100.02 lbs. But this result will be true only if the distribution in penguin masses beyond the limits seen in the first million penguins is well behaved, in particular falling off more rapidly than 1/mass. Suppose one penguin in a million weighs 100,000,000 lbs. Since we have examined only 1 million penguins, there is an appreciable chance (P = e −1 = 0.38) that we would have missed one of the supermassive ones. Yet, these supermassive penguins make the true mean = 200 lbs. So, even if the already measured data is well behaved, it is easy to be fooled by extreme cases falling beyond the observed distribution. One is less likely to be fooled about the median mass.
In the above example we would deduce that, with N = 1, 000, 000, the expected r value of TM and its standard deviation would be 0.5 and 0.0005 respectively. Thus, we would say with 95% (2 σ) confidence that TM has an r value between 0.499 and 0.501. In other words, we expect the true median weight of penguins to lie between the weight of the 499,000th and the 501,000th most massive of the million measured penguins. These are distributed approximately normally so the 499,000th most massive weighs 99.975 lbs and the 501,000th weighs 100.025 lbs. Thus, with 95% confidence we would say that the true median lies between 99.975 lbs and 100.025 lbs. Note that these limits are only slightly less constraining than the 95% confidence limits derived on the mean earlier. Furthermore, these limits are not invalidated by the supermassive one-in-a-million penguins. Their existence only changes TM to 100.000025 lbs. If one's data points are independent and there are no systematic effects, the median value is not going to be greatly perturbed by data points lying beyond the range of observed values -whereas the mean can always be significantly perturbed.
In short, the 95% confidence limits on the true median are not much wider than those derived for the mean (assuming a Gaussian distribution), and they are more secure since the hypothesis of a Gaussian distribution is dropped.
Hubble Constant

Approaches to Hubble Constant Statistics
The history of attempts to estimate the Hubble constant invites the application of statistics that are robust with respect to non-Gaussianity in the error distribution. Until recently, many published estimates of the Hubble constant, H 0 = 100h km s −1 Mpc −1 , differed by several times their quoted uncertainty range. The most famous historical contradiction was that between estimates published by Sandage, Tammann and collaborators, typically h = 0.5 ± 0.05, and de Vaucouleurs and collaborators, typically h = 0.9 ± 0.1. What should one believe when reputable astronomers have published values that differ by 4 σ? If a priori we gave equal weight to the two groups, our technique would ignore the quoted errors and allocate a chance P = 25% that h < 0.5, P = 50% that 0.5 < h < 0.9, and P = 25% that h > 0.9 -which is probably reasonable if these were the only available data.
Another approach to determining H 0 from a collection of measurements is to filter out, or at least give smaller weight to, "wrong" observations and use only the best published estimates. "Wrong" in this context means observational values plus their errors that are unlikely to prove correct given the other data in hand. Press (1997) develops an elegant Bayesian technique using this approach, beginning with 13 reputable measurements of H 0 , and finds a mean of h = 0.74 and 95% confidence (2 σ around the mean) range 0.66 < h < 0.82.
Our approach to analyzing the same Hubble constant data set is like that suggested by Zeldovich -use all the data and take the median. If we apply our median statistics method to the same set of 13 H 0 measurements used by Press (1997) , we obtain a median of h = 0.73 and 97.8% confidence limits of 0.55 < h < 0.81. These results are nearly identical to Press's result, without any assumption of Gaussianity or even looking at the 13 error estimates of the observers. Note that our uncertainties are not symmetric and the range quoted is not exactly 95% because we do not assume Gaussianity and therefore we do not interpolate probabilities between the estimates (one could use these limits as conservative estimates of the 95% limits, since the 95% confidence region lies somewhere between them).
Our treatment assumes that the rank of the next measurement is random, thus the next measurement is equally likely to land between any of the previous measurements (or below/above the smallest/largest). For those who would like a Bayesian treatment, this assumed distribution of the next measurement is our prior for the median, which we multiply by the binomial likelihood of observing N tails/heads to determine the probability distribution of the true median given the previous data.
331 Estimates of the Hubble Constant
We now apply our median statistics method to 331 published measurements of the Hubble constant (Huchra 1999) . After deleting four entries in the table from 1924 and 1925 that lacked actual estimates of H 0 , the June 15, 1999 version of this catalog contained 331 published estimates, the most recent dated 1999.458. These have a large range, including Hubble's early high values (near h = 5) and, on the low end, values as small as h = 0.24 inferred from measurements of the Sunyaev-Zeldovich effect in clusters (McHardy et al. 1990 ). However the relative likelihood of the true median as defined by these measurements and using eq. (1) is very narrow, as indicated by Figure 1 . The published estimates were tabulated as integer values in km s −1 Mpc −1 and there are many identical estimates. Figure 1 shows the relative likelihood of the true median of H 0 in bins centered on these integral values. The median value of the 331 measurements is h = 0.67; arguably this is an extremely reasonable estimate of the Hubble constant. The 95% statistical confidence limits are approximately 0.65 < h < 0.69, obtained by integrating over the tails of the binomial likelihood distribution. These are surprisingly narrow limits. This result illustrates that the assumptions of independence and lack of systematic errors alone are very powerful. These purely statistical uncertainties are certainly a lower bound on the true errors, both because the entries in Huchra's table are not independent measurements and because of systematic uncertainties in various methods for measuring H 0 . Below we discuss the possible impact of systematic effects on our median statistics estimate of the Hubble constant.
The strong effect of including or removing a small number of estimates illustrates how the mean can be biased upwards or downwards by a few extreme values, while the median remains insensitive to these outliers. The mean of the 331 H 0 estimates is h = 0.80 with 95% limits 0.76 < h < 0.84, inconsistent with our median statistics. After excluding the 10 estimates published before Sandage's (1958) paper that discusses Hubble's confusion of HII regions for bright stars, the median of the remaining 321 estimates is again 0.67 with 95% limits 0.65 < h < 0.69. However, the mean of this culled sample is h = 0.68 with 95% limits 0.66 < h < 0.70, perfectly consistent with median statistics. The result seems obvious; removing the systematically high estimates makes sense because we are aware of systematic errors of the type that Sandage (1958) points out. A strength of median statistics is robustness when we lack such knowledge.
For comparison with the median and mean, we find that the mode of the 331 estimates is h = 0.55. 11 of the 19 estimates with this value were published by Sandage, Tammann, and collaborators.
The importance of using the median to estimate the true value of H 0 from a sample of estimates becomes apparent when we consider the arbitrariness of the Hubble relation, v = H 0 r. A trivial rewriting of this relation as r = τ H v describes identical physics. Had the relation first been written in this form, we would all be trying to measure the Hubble time, τ H = 1/H 0 . However, using the mean to estimate these parameters would give inconsistent answers because the mean of a sample of H 0 estimates is not the same as the inverse of the mean of τ H estimates,H 0 = 1/τ H . For the sample of 331 H 0 estimates, the mean of H 0 yields h = 0.80 but the inverse of the mean of τ H yields h = 0.66 (excluding the ten pre-1958 estimates yields h = 0.68 and h = 0.65, respectively). In contrast, the median yields identical estimates, thus guaranteeing that the central values of H 0 and τ H obey the correct relation τ H = 1/H 0 .
Systematic Effects and Uncertainties in the Median of H 0
The small range of the 95% confidence interval (statistical errors only) may cause one to immediately and rightly object that these H 0 estimates are neither independent nor free of systematic errors. Regarding the latter objection alone, we might consider the set of H 0 measurements as 331 "Russian watches." As long as the same systematic effect does not plague an overwhelming number of the measurements, the median of the measurements should be relatively robust (certainly more so than the mean). The lack of independence of these measurements implies that the same systematic bias might affect at least one group of published estimates but, again, this should not strongly affect the median unless this group of estimates is a significant fraction of the 331. In fact we find that similar systematics could affect the majority of the estimates and so we must evaluate this effect. Of course, the real concern about independence and systematic errors is their impact on the confidence intervals, which are remarkably small. That the 95% confidence interval of purely statistical errors ranges over ±2 km s −1 Mpc −1 , while astronomers have long argued over differences of ±10 km s −1 Mpc −1 and larger, merely points out that systematic effects are the likely dominant source of uncertainty.
In the following discussion we attempt to assess the possible impact of systematic errors on our median statistics analysis. Exhaustive analysis of systematic errors in measurement of the Hubble constant is obviously beyond the scope of this paper. Many of the methods of H 0 estimation have well-known possible systematics. First, the overwhelming majority of methods are tied to the LMC distance scale and/or calibration of the Cepheid period-luminosity relation. Of the 331 estimates, probably not many more than 52 (those based on the CMB, the Sunyaev-Zeldovich effect, and gravitational lensing time delays) are certain to be independent of the LMC and Cepheid observations. Thus, roughly 84% of the sample of estimates could share similar systematic uncertainty. Many recent measurements, roughly 130 of the 331 (∼ 39%), are specifically tied to the HST Cepheid distance scale. So, the data set clearly violates the above assumption that no group of measurements subject to the same systematic effect forms a significant fraction of the sample. Below we address the impact of this lack of independence.
The "Cepheid-free" methods each have their own possible systematic errors. Estimation of H 0 using the Sunyaev-Zeldovich effect in clusters typically assumes that the gas in clusters is smoothly distributed; clumpiness in the gas would cause the true H 0 to be lower than estimated. Clusters are more likely to be included in optical cluster catalogs and targeted for observation of the S-Z effect if they are prolate along the line-of-sight; such a projection effect would cause H 0 to be larger than estimated (e.g., Sulkanen 1999) . Using gravitational lens time delays to estimate H 0 requires assumption of a model for the mass distribution in the lens, which can be non-trivial. Changes in the mass model have substantial impact on the derived H 0 and could push the estimates up or down, depending on the assumed model (for discussion regarding 0957+561 see, e.g., Falco, Gorenstein, & Shapiro 1991 , Kochanek 1991 .
Uncertainty in the LMC distance seems likely to be the dominant source of error in the majority of H 0 estimates. The LMC distance modulus assumed in many recent H 0 analyses (e.g., Mould et al. 2000) is m−M = 18.5, corresponding to an LMC distance of 50 kpc. This distance modulus has quite large uncertainty; some recently published values span from m − M = 18.1 (Stanek, Zaritsky, & Harris 1998) to 18.7 (Feast, Pont, & Whitelock 1998) . Because a shortening of the distance scale by δ(m − M ) = 0.1 corresponds to a 4.7% upward shift in H 0 , this could be a very large effect. When Mould et al. use the histogram of recent LMC distance moduli to model the effect of this uncertainty, they infer a possible bias of 4.5% (in the sense that the true value of H 0 would lie above the estimate arrived at when Gaussian errors were assumed) and a total uncertainty (1σ) of 12% in the value of H 0 from combining all the Key Project results.
We can assess the uncertainty in the LMC distance modulus and the resulting uncertainty in the true median of H 0 in the same way that we analyze the H 0 data themselves; we apply median statistics to the distribution of published m − M . Examining Gibson's (2000) compilation of 38 recent measurements of the LMC distance, we find that the median of these is m − M = 18.39 with 95% confidence limits 18.3 < (m − M ) < 18.52. This median lies below the nominal m − M = 18.5 partly due to the number of recent measurements that use red clump stars, which typically yield m − M ∼ 18.3 or smaller (this tail of smaller m − M is also what causes the possible shift of H 0 by 4.5% in the modeling performed by Mould et al.) . To estimate the range of systematic uncertainty in the LMC distance modulus due to different methods we apply median statistics to these data, but give equal weight to different methods (as we shall do below with H 0 ). Grouping the 38 LMC estimates into 11 different methods (taking the median of estimates among each group), the median of the methods (the median of medians) is m − M = 18.46 with 95% limits 18.26 < (m − M ) < 18.64. This median agrees with the median of values in the histogram in Figure  1 of Mould et al. (2000) . Relative to H 0 estimated with the nominal LMC distance modulus of m − M = 18.5, the median statistics of different methods implies that H 0 could be shifted upwards by 1.9% with a 95% confidence range that spans from 8.0% below to 9.6% above the revised median.
It is reasonable to assume that a range of LMC m − M have been used in the past; too small a value led to erroneously large H 0 and vice versa. Correcting this ensemble of estimates to use the true value would therefore narrow the distribution of H 0 estimates and might cause a small shift in the median. However, to evaluate the possible impact of the LMC distance modulus uncertainty on our median statistics estimate of H 0 , let us suppose that all but the 52 "Cepheid-free" estimates had used the same value, m − M = 18.5, to calibrate the distance scale. Since many workers are know to have used other distance moduli (e.g., de Vaucouleurs advocated a shorter distance scale, using m − M = 18.4 or smaller; de Vaucouleurs 1993), this assumption may lead us to overestimate the impact on the median. If all the H 0 estimates that could be plagued by dependence on the LMC distance modulus were to shift in identical fashion, then we estimate the effect of the 8.0% lower and 9.6% upper 95% systematic limits by multiplying these bounds by 0.84. Thus, using the distribution of LMC distance moduli to model the systematic uncertainty in H 0 and assuming that all but 52 of the estimates suffer from this same systematic uncertainty yields a possible shift of δh = 0.01 and 95% systematic errors of (−0.045, +0.055), roughly 7.5% in either direction.
Other systematic effects on the Cepheid distance scale include metallicity effects on the periodluminosity relation and uncertainties in photometry. If metallicity corrections to the Cepheid zeropoint based on spectroscopic [O/H] abundance (Kennicutt et al. 1998 ) are applied to the HST Key Project Cepheids, their summary estimate of H 0 decreases by 4.5% (Mould et al. 2000) . On the other hand, use of Stetson's (1998) WFPC2 calibration would cause Cepheid calibration based on HST to be revised in such a way to shift H 0 upwards by 4%. Another photometric uncertainty concerns blending of Cepheids (Mochejska et al. 2000; cf. Gibson, Maloney, & Sakai 2000) ; photometric blending of Cepheids with other stars would cause the distance modulus to be underestimated, thus overestimating H 0 .
Of the four possible sources of systematic error in the HST Cepheid distance scale that we have mentioned, two (LMC distance modulus, WPFC2 calibration) might increase H 0 while two (metallicity effects, photometric blending) might decrease H 0 . The magnitude of these effects varies and we do not consider them equally likely, so assuming mutual cancellation of these effects is not justified. However, we would be quite unlucky if all these or other systematic effects fell in the same direction. As shown by Mould et al. (2000) , the LMC distance scale uncertainty is the dominant source of systematic error in H 0 estimated by the HST Key Project. We conclude that the systematic error on the median value of H 0 (which is not the same as the uncertainty on any one measurement, nor any one group of measurements, such as those of the HST Key Project) due to uncertainty in the LMC distance modulus and/or Cepheid calibration is of order the LMC effect described above, roughly 7.5% or δh = 0.05 in either direction at the 95% confidence level.
Historically, debate among workers in the field has often centered on the impact of systematic effects on measurement of H 0 , with the expected tendency (on which progress in science keenly relies) of each group to point out systematics that might plague the others' measurements. We remain agnostic regarding these debates and examine the possible effects of systematic effects on H 0 by analyzing the distribution of H 0 estimates, grouping these estimates by method and/or by research group. If systematic effects in one method or group dominate the 331 published estimates, then excluding them should shift the median statistics estimate.
Huchra classifies the published estimates into 18 primary types by method and 5 secondary types by author or group of authors. Using these types to group the estimates, we examine the dependence of H 0 statistics on the methods employed and the investigators who report the estimates. The median of "No Type" is h = 0.68, thus excluding results published by the best-known workers in the field would have no impact on the median value of H 0 . The median of the type medians is also h = 0.68. One might also be curious about the effect of excluding a particular group's work. Excluding each group in turn renders the following medians and 95% confidence limits: no HST KP h = 0.65, 0.62 < h < 0.68; no Sandage and Tammann h = 0.68, 0.65 < h < 0.70; no de Vaucouleurs and van den Bergh h = 0.66, 0.64 < h < 0.69. Thus, completely excluding any one of these renowned investigators or teams would shift the median by at most δh = 0.02.
The history of a number of fundamental constants shows a systematic trend with time. Certainly this is the case when we compare very high early estimates of H 0 with more modern values, because of systematic effects like those pointed out by Sandage (1958) . Has such a trend continued? Excluding measurements before 1990 yields a median value h = 0.65 and 95% limits 0.62 < h < 0.68. Further culling the sample to include only "HST era" measurements (post 1996) yields a median h = 0.65 with 95% limits 0.62 < h < 0.67.
We can extend this "historical" analysis by examining only measurements too recent to have been included in the original version of this manuscript. Between June 15, 1999 and August 2, 2000, 46 entries were added to Huchra's catalog, one of these being the value of h = 0.67 in the preprint of this paper. How would our analysis treat an entry such as ours as it appears in Huchra's table? We would take the central value seriously, but ignore the quite small uncertainty. Excluding our own value, the median of the remaining 45 new entries is h = 0.69 with 95% confidence limits of 0.65 < h < 0.71. The mean of these same entries is h = 0.67 with 95% confidence limits 0.65 < h < 0.70. Thus, comparison with our estimate of the median above shows that the 45 new estimates are entirely consistent with the median of the previous 331.
Systematic differences between the results of different methods of measuring H 0 are also apparent in these data. Grouping the estimates by method and applying median statistics yields an estimate of the range of systematic errors that separate the methods. This approach also addresses the possible concern that our analysis of the 331 estimates gives equal weight to each publication, including proceedings and summary articles that restate previous results. Table 1 lists the primary types into which Huchra (1999) classifies the published estimates. Columns 2 and 3 list the number in each type and the median of estimates for each type (mean of the central two for even numbers of estimates).
The median of the 18 methods is h = 0.70, slightly higher than the median of all 331 estimates. The 95% uncertainty range 0.645 < h < 0.745 of the median of methods includes the median of all 331 estimates, h = 0.67. This result is unchanged by excluding the questionable "Irvine" (not a method, but rather a meeting), "No Type" and "CMB fit" values. If the median value for each method is an accurate representation of the result of applying that method, then these confidence limits on the median of methods is indicative of the range of systematic error among different methods, roughly 7% or δh = 0.05 in either direction. It is improbable that the systematic errors in the various methods all go in the same direction, therefore correction of systematic errors in all the methods is likely to narrow the distribution of H 0 estimates and might shift the median. Some of the systematic spread in the methods may be due to different assumed LMC distance moduli (so the 7% systematic range here is not independent of the uncertainty due to the LMC distance discussed above) or freedom from that distance scale calibration (allowing the "global" methods such as gravitational lensing and S-Z tend to yield smaller estimates of H 0 than the locally-calibrated methods). This range of systematic error is slightly smaller than the 7.5% range from possible LMC distance modulus/Cepheid calibration uncertainties computed above. We expect this to be so, because the 7.5% range assumed that all but 52 of the 331 estimates would suffer from identical systematics, which is clearly an overestimate.
We conclude that the true median of 331 estimates of H 0 is h = 0.67 ± 0.02(95% statistical) ± 0.05(95% systematic), where the systematic error, also derived using median statistics, is dominated by uncertainty in the LMC distance modulus. This allows for a systematic error range that is slightly larger than that inferred by examining the range of estimates produced using different methods of H 0 measurement. Our estimate of h = 0.67 is arguably the best current summary of our knowledge of H 0 . It is in reasonable agreement with most recent estimates, is based on almost all measurements, and makes no assumptions about the distribution of errors from individual measurements.
Mass of Pluto
The history of mass estimates for Pluto is an extreme example illustrating the effects of systematic errors. Early measurements of the mass of the Pluto-Charon system were obtained by observing perturbations in the orbit of Neptune. Errors in the orbit of Neptune dominated the analysis and these were mistaken for the influence of Pluto. These errors led to many measurements of Pluto's mass that were larger than an Earth mass. This was, of course, a systematic error. Later, when Charon was discovered, the mass of the Pluto-Charon system could be measured with great accuracy. If we examine 60 published values of the mass of Pluto-Charon (Marcialis 1997) we obtain a median mass of approximately 0.7 Earth masses with 95% confidence limits between 0.1 and 1.0 Earth masses (see Figure 2) . This is incorrect because of a now well-known systematic error, similar to the mistake made by Hubble in his estimates of H 0 . If we examine only the 28 measurements taken after 1950 (we pick that date simply to divide the century and the data set roughly in half), we obtain a median value of 0.00246 Earth masses, which is almost exactly the modernly-accepted value, with 95% limits from 0.00236 to 0.08 Earth masses. Lacking knowledge of the Neptune systematic, this extreme trend with time would alone provide a strong clue that systematic errors dominated the uncertainty in M Pluto . Such a trend would not be readily apparent using the mean. Even after culling the pre-1950 data the mean is still too high: M Pluto = 0.157 with standard deviation 0.060. This strongly contrasts with the case of the Hubble constant in the previous section, in which excluding the pre-1958 data, which were contaminated by Hubble's systematic error of mistaking HII regions for stars, does not change the median.
The lesson here is that median statistics are more robust than the mean but are not immune to systematic errors. The point of examining these Pluto data is to show a case where even median statistics fail; there is no magic bullet for faulty data sets.
SNe Ia Data and Binomial Constraints on
Recent analyses reported by the High-z Supernova Search Team (R98) and the Supernova Cosmology Project (P99) place extremely stringent constraints on cosmological models, including evidence for a positive cosmological constant at the many σ level. It is important to examine the sensitivity of these results to the use of χ 2 analyses and the assumptions underlying this approach. Both for this purpose and simply to demonstrate the use of median statistics, here we apply median statistics to the R98 high-redshift SNe Ia data. These data are, with the exception of SN 1997ck at redshift z = 0.97 6 , of excellent quality and the size of the high-z part of this data set, N = 16, lends itself to a clear pedagogical discussion of median statistics. In what follows we use the MLCS data of R98, and set h = 0.652 (their calibrated value and consistent with our median). In Section 7 below, we apply our median statistics analysis to the larger set of high-z SNe Ia from P99.
In the following analyses we use the most recent R98 and P99 data to constrain cosmological parameters. We emphasize that, like analyses done by R98 and P99, our median statistics analyses rely on hypothesis (2), that there are no systematic effects in the data. A number of astrophysical processes and effects (the mechanism responsible for the supernova, evolution, environmental effects, intergalactic dust, etc.) could, in principle, strongly affect our conclusions (see, e.g. We note that our estimate of H 0 in section 3 is consistent with that found by R98 from an analysis of their MLCS data, h = 0.652 ± 0.013 (1 σ statistical error only), thus we use the R98 value of h = 0.652 in the likelihood analysis of the supernovae below in order to vary only the statistical method applied to these data.
Using each supernova observation to estimate Ω M , we use our median statistic method to obtain a robust estimate of Ω M . Let's first consider the case where we assume that Ω Λ = 0; these are Friedmann big bang models characterized by the value of Ω M . Each of the 16 distant supernovae produces an independent estimate of Ω M -the value of Ω M such that the supernova's estimated brightness (from looking at the shape of its light curve) and its predicted brightness (given its z) agree exactly. Presumably, if we did an enormous number of such measurements, the true median value of Ω M obtained would give us our best estimate of the true value of Ω M , assuming as always that there are no systematic effects. Listed in the left column of Table 2 are the 16 estimates of Ω M from the 16 supernovae -ranked in order of their value. In the middle column is the confidence (using eq. [1] above) that the true median (Ω T M ) lies between the corresponding values just above and just below it in the column on the left.
Thus, there is a 0.00153% chance that the value of Ω T M is greater than 5.96, and a 2.78% chance that 0.0426 < Ω T M < 0.206, and so forth. The 99.6% confidence limits on Ω T M are −1.60 < Ω T M < 0.656. The Ω M = 1, Ω Λ = 0 model is ruled out at the 99.6% confidence level. This is a dramatic result. R98 likewise rule out this model at a similarly high confidence level but we have done so without assuming that the errors are Gaussian.
The chance that Ω T M < 0 (which would be unphysical, and indicate that a simple Friedmann model with Ω Λ = 0 was inadequate) is between 89.5% and 96.2% so we can not say that the Ω Λ = 0 Friedmann models with Ω M > 0 are ruled out at the 95% confidence level. (It would be correct to say that they are ruled out at the 89.5% level however.) This compares with the more dramatic R98 statement that there is a 99.5% probability that Ω Λ > 0 and that therefore all Ω Λ = 0 models with Ω M > 0 are ruled out. These data are not sufficient to cause median statistics to rule out the Ω Λ = 0 models (with 95% confidence).
If we argued that we know independently that Ω M > 0.0426 from nucleosynthesis results and masses in groups and clusters of galaxies, and from large scale structure, then with this additional constraint we could argue that the acceptable Ω Λ = 0, Ω M > 0 models are ruled out at the 96.2% confidence level. This is just slightly above the 95% confidence level.
Bayesian Constraints on Ω M and Ω Λ from 16 R98 High-z SNe Ia
Observational data favor low density cosmogonies. The simplest low-density models have either flat spatial hypersurfaces and a constant or time-variable cosmological "constant" Λ (see, e.g., Peebles 1984; Sahni & Starobinsky 2000; Steinhardt 1999; Carroll 2000; Binétruy 2000) , or open spatial hypersurfaces and no Λ (see, e.g., Gott 1982 Gott , 1997 Ratra & Peebles 1994 Kamionkowski et al. 1994; Górski et al. 1998) . In this and the next section we consider a more general model with a constant Λ that has open, closed, or flat spatial hypersurfaces. Two of the currently favored models lie along the lines Ω Λ = 0 or Ω M + Ω Λ = 1 in the two-dimensional (Ω Λ , Ω M ) parameter plane of this more general model. In Section 8 we consider a model with a time-variable Λ.
We can translate the binomial results (such as those derived in the previous section) into Bayesian constraints. Bayesian statistics says that the posterior probability of a particular model after analyzing the data at hand is proportional to the prior probability of that model multiplied by the likelihood of obtaining the observational data given that model. Consider a model with Ω Λ = 0 and Ω M = 6. For this model, all 16 supernovae estimates of Ω M are lower than the true value Ω M = 6 (see Table 2 ), thus all 16 distant supernovae would have intrinsic luminosities that are fainter than we expect. Since each represents independent data and we are assuming no systematic effects, that means that the likelihood of this happening is 1/2 16 (since each individual supernova has an independent probability of 1/2 of being fainter than we expect based on the low redshift supernovae).
Suppose we next consider a model with Ω Λ = 0 and Ω M = 2. Table 2 we would conclude that if we initially found a model with Ω Λ = 0, Ω M = 6 and a model with Ω Λ = 0, Ω M = 2 to be a priori equally likely, with odds of 1 : 1, then after consulting the supernovae data we would give odds of 16 : 1 in favor of the Ω M = 2 model over the Ω M = 6 model.
One can perform similar analyses for models with other values of Ω M and Ω Λ by examining Figure 3 . These plots show, for each supernova, the locus of values of (Ω M , Ω Λ ) that predict the corrected apparent brightness (see, e.g., Goobar & Perlmutter 1995) . To compute the likelihood of a particular model (value of Ω M and Ω Λ ), count the number of SNe Ia that are too bright/faint for the model, compute the binomial likelihoods, and apply the prior (note that 2 SNe Ia lie off the bottom and 4 off the top of the linear scale plot, Figure 3b ). Figure 4 allows one to do this "by eye". In this figure, the greyscale intensity at each point in the (Ω M , Ω Λ ) plane is proportional to the binomial likelihood of the observed SNe Ia being brighter/fainter than predicted by the model with that pair of values of (Ω M , Ω Λ ). Not surprisingly, the favored region in this plane is similar to that found by R98. Solid lines in Figure 4 show 1, 2, and 3 σ likelihood contours derived from a χ 2 analysis (Podariu & Ratra 2000).
If we limit ourselves to consideration of flat cosmologies then Ω M + Ω Λ = 1 and the allowed models lie along the long-dashed "flat universe" lines in Figures 3 and 4 . To examine this region in detail, Figure 5 plots the relative likelihoods of Ω T M lying in ranges of Ω M bounded by the intersection of the loci in Figure 3a with the flat universe line. Irrespective of the assumed prior, the best-fit flat-Λ model has Ω M ∼ 0.3, in agreement with R98 and P99.
One must adopt reasonable prior probabilities to perform a more complete Bayesian analysis. If the prior probability was P = 100% that the Ω M = 1, Ω Λ = 0 fiducial Friedmann model was correct, then no matter what data was examined, after examining that data one would still conclude with 100% certainty that the Ω M = 1, Ω Λ = 0 model was correct. This is because the prior probability of all other models is zero, and zero times even a high likelihood is still zero. Thus this is a bad prior. Priors should be as agnostic as possible to allow, as much as possible, the data and not the prior determine the odds.
Vague or "non-informative" priors are appropriate in this situation (Press 1989 ). An appropriate vague prior for an unbounded variable x that can be positive, zero, or negative is uniform in x: P (x)dx ∝ dx. But for an unbounded variable x that must be positive the correct vague prior is the Jeffreys (1961) prior which is uniform in the logarithm of x: P (x)dx ∝ d ln x = dx/x (Berger 1985) . (If x must be positive then the variable ln x can be positive, zero, or negative and therefore should be distributed uniformly in d ln x via the previous rule.) That the vague prior for a number that is positive and unbounded should be uniform in the logarithm is well established and related to the rule that the first digits of positive numbers in a data table (like lengths of rivers) should be distributed according to the space they occupy on the slide rule (i.e., uniform in the logarithm). Thus in any data set involving positive numbers we should expect as many to have a first digit of 1 as the sum of those starting with 2 or 3, and as the sum of those starting with 4, 5, 6, or 7.
R98 and P99 assume a vague prior with Ω M and Ω Λ as free parameters and the prior probability proportional to dΩ M dΩ Λ . This would be appropriate for variables that could take on positive or zero or negative values. This may be reasonable for Ω Λ since people certainly consider both positive and zero values of Ω Λ plausible. Since we know little about what sets the level of the vacuum density it could conceivably be negative as well. However, Ω M must be positive. No one envisions a negative or zero density of matter. In fact, R98 and P99 do not consider models with Ω M not positive. Standard Friedmann models with negative values of Ω M would easily explain the data with maximum likelihood (e.g., −0.303 < Ω M < −0.266 from Table 2) but these are not considered because Ω M ≤ 0 is thought to be unphysical. It is also clear that Ω M is not a priori bounded above. Thus, the appropriate vague prior for Ω M is uniform in ln Ω M .
In other words, a priori there should be an equal probability of finding Ω M between 0.1 and 0.2 or finding Ω M between 0.2 and 0.4. More generally, the log prior allows an equal chance of the universe being either open or closed. So if both Ω M and Ω Λ are free parameters, we should expect a priori, before examining the data, for P (Ω Λ , Ω M )dΩ Λ dΩ M to be proportional to dΩ Λ dΩ M /Ω M . This is more favorable to low density models than the prior R98 and P99 have chosen 7 .
Perhaps a more serious problem with the prior adopted by R98 and P99 is that it gives zero weight to the flat-Λ model and the Ω Λ = 0 model. After assuming P (Ω Λ , Ω M )dΩ Λ dΩ M proportional to dΩ Λ dΩ M , R98 state that the posterior probability that Ω Λ > 0 is 99.5%. But what this really means is that, according to their prior, the posterior probability that Ω Λ < 0 is 0.5% and that the probability that Ω Λ = 0 is 0%. Furthermore, the posterior probability that Ω Λ + Ω M = 1 is also 0%. This is because the prior probability of Ω Λ = 0 or Ω Λ + Ω M = 1 is zero because these are lines of zero area in the Ω Λ , Ω M plane. Clearly, the prior adopted by R98 and P99 is not reasonable. This shortcoming of these analyses has also been noted by Drell et al. (2000) .
Occam's razor suggests that models that are simpler must have higher prior probability. One suggestion often used is that the prior probability for a model with N free parameters is P = (1/2) N +1 . Thus the prior probability that the correct model is one with no free fitting parameters is 50%. The prior probability that the correct model is one with one free fitting parameter is 25%, and with two free fitting parameters is 12.5% and so forth. The infinite sum, up to N = ∞ equals 100% as expected. Having additional free parameters to fit the data always makes fitting any data easier and there has to be a penalty for this. The Ω M = 1, Ω Λ = 0 Einstein-de Sitter model is one with no free fitting parameters. For this reason it has been called the fiducial cold dark matter model. The steady-state model also is a model with no free fitting parameters -this was one 7 Podariu & Ratra (2000) illustrate the effect of such a non-informative prior on the confidence contours derived from χ 2 analyses.
of the attractions of this model for its proponents. The steady-state model is spatially flat and expands exponentially, a(t) ∝ exp(t/r 0 ). Geometrically, this model is identical to a Ω Λ = 1, Ω M = 0 model. If the steady-state model were correct 12 supernovae would be too bright and 4 would be too faint, giving a likelihood of 1820/2 16 . The Ω M = 1 Einstein-de Sitter model by contrast has 14 supernovae too faint and 2 supernovae too bright, giving a likelihood of 120/2 16 . If we regarded the odds between these two competing models as a priori 1 : 1 before examining the supernovae data, we would give posterior odds of 15 : 1 in favor of the steady-state model after examining the supernovae data.
Let us illustrate our Bayesian technique by considering how we would have evaluated the competing models in the early 1960's, if the supernovae data had been available then. At that time Ω Λ > 0 models were not popular. The two main zero free parameter models were the Ω M = 1, Ω Λ = 0 Einstein-de Sitter model and the steady-state model. The only popular one-parameter model was the Ω Λ = 0 Friedmann model with Ω M as a free parameter. This may be considered the Friedmann models with Ω M = 1 because in this one-parameter family the Ω M = 1 model is a set of measure zero. Now, if zero-parameter models as a group were considered to have prior probability of 50%, and one-parameter models as a group had a prior probability of 25%, then we would assign a prior probability of 25% to the steady-state model, 25% to the Einstein-de Sitter model, and 25% to the Ω Λ = 0, Ω M = 1 Friedmann model, and 25% to more complicated models with 2 or more free parameters. If we were to discount more complicated models and renormalize, then we would have prior probabilities of 33.3% for the steady-state model, 33.3% for the Einstein-de Sitter model, and 33.3% for the Ω Λ = 0, Ω M = 1 Friedmann model. Independent measurements of the mass in clusters of galaxies would suggest a minimum value of Ω M of 0.05, and Hubble diagrams to measure q 0 from galaxies indicate a maximum value of Ω M = 4. Since the prior for Ω M is distributed uniformly in ln Ω M we can calculate the prior probabilities of finding Ω M in different ranges. These prior values will be revised by the likelihoods after examining the supernova data. Table 3 lists the prior probabilities for the different models, and how these values would be revised by multiplying the priors in each model (and over each range of Ω M in the Ω Λ = 0 Friedmann models with Ω M = 1) by the relative likelihoods from Table 2 above, and renormalizing the results to give a total probability of 100%.
The steady-state model and the 0.05 < Ω M < 0.2 models would be the only ones to gain ground due to the supernovae data. Ranking the 5 models in order of posterior probability, we would see that at the 95% confidence level (that our reduced list still included the correct model) we could only rule out the 1 < Ω M < 4 models. The others would remain in contention. The steady-state model would have been favored by the supernova data. It is of course an accelerating model, but one that is no longer in contention.
Today the models in contention are different. The steady-state model has no Big Bang and is ruled out by the cosmic microwave background. The only zero-parameter model still in contention is the Einstein-de Sitter model so by Occam's Razor it gets 50% of the prior probability. There are two one-parameter models in contention, the Ω Λ = 0 open model with 0.05 < Ω M < 4, and the Ω M + Ω Λ = 1 flat-Λ model with −1 < Ω Λ < 0.95. Together, these one-parameter models must get 25% of the prior probability. The two-parameter model has both Ω M and Ω Λ variable, with 0.05 < Ω M < 4, and −1 < Ω Λ < 1. Ω Λ can be both positive or negative and so its prior probability is uniform in dΩ Λ . Ω M must be positive and so is distributed uniformly in d ln Ω M . This is the only two-parameter model under consideration so its prior probability must be 12.5%. The prior probability of other more complicated models would be 12.5%. We can renormalize to give unit probability to the sum of just the models under consideration (with 0, 1, and 2 free parameters). Summing the prior probabilities listed in Table 4 , we find prior probabilities of 18.6% for open, 71.4% for flat, and 9.96% for closed. We have prior probabilities of 14.5% for Λ < 0, 71.4% for Λ = 0, and 14.1% for Λ > 0.
After observing the supernovae, the zero-parameter Einstein-de Sitter model suffers greatly, dropping to 9.37%, though still not ruled out by the usual 95% criterion. The greatest beneficiaries of the supernova results are Λ > 0 models; flat Λ > 0 models rise from 6.97% to 41.53% while open Λ > 0 models rise from a mere 3.34% to 27.48%. Almost as impressive are quite low Ω M open (Ω Λ = 0) models, that rise in probability from 4.52% to 13.33%. Table 5 summarizes this analysis. First, let us examine the evidence for a non-zero cosmological constant. We find that the posterior probability of Λ > 0 is 70%. This result differs from the 99.5% claimed by R98. A posteriori, Λ = 0 models have a 27% probability of being correct, thus such models are still quite viable, in agreement with the conclusion of Drell et al. (2000) . R98 find 0% probability for such models, because they disallowed this possibility in their prior. Similar to R98, we find that Λ < 0 models are ruled out at greater than 97% confidence.
Is the universe open or closed? We rule out closed-universe models with greater than 98% confidence, but the odds are evenly split between flat and open models. The 16 SNe Ia slightly decrease the probability of flat models, from our prior of 71% to a posterior probability of 51.5%, while significantly increasing the probability of open models, from our prior of 18.6% to a posterior probability of 47%.
Alternatively, we could be more conservative since, because of age considerations and the amount of power on large scales in galaxy clustering, it could be argued that the only models currently under serious discussion are those with 0.05 ≤ Ω M < 1, and with 0 ≤ Ω Λ < 1. That eliminates all parameter-free models, leaving the flat-Λ (Ω M + Ω Λ = 1) model and the Ω Λ = 0 open model as the only one-parameter ones and allows the two-parameter model where Ω M and Ω Λ are both allowed to vary. The one-parameter models together have a prior probability that is twice that of the two-parameter model, again by Occam's razor. Since there are two competing one-parameter models, all three models must have equal prior probability of 33.3%. This reflects fairly well the prior probabilities as thought of by astronomers today, before seeing the supernova data. Again since Λ may be zero, we use a prior that is uniform in dΩ Λ for both the flat-Λ model and the two-parameter model. Figure 4b shows the relative likelihood for models in this more restricted (Ω M , Ω Λ ) space, with greyscale intensity proportional to the likelihood as in Figure 4a. For comparison, the plotted lines show the confidence regions computed in similar fashion to R98 (derived in Podariu & Ratra 2000) . Table 6 presents the priors and results after including the SNe Ia data for this restricted modern analysis. This gives prior probabilities of 56.1% for open, 33.3% for flat, and 10.5% closed. It also gives prior probabilities of 33.3% for Λ = 0, and 66.7% for Λ > 0. Under these restricted conditions the Ω Λ = 0 Friedmann models with 0.2 < Ω M < 1 suffer the most, but end with the same ∼ 3% posterior probability as under the broader analysis above. Open universe Λ > 0 models substantially increase in probability after considering the supernova data. This analysis uses more (non-SNe Ia) astrophysical evidence in the computation of the prior probabilities, thus restricting Ω M and Ω Λ to smaller ranges than those considered reasonable in the previous analysis.
So far, we have used a log prior for Ω M , in keeping with the positive-definite property of the density of matter. To examine the sensitivity of our median statistics results to this choice of prior for Ω M , we also compute posterior probabilities using a uniform prior for Ω M . This is useful because our analysis above differs from those of R98 and P99 both in its use of median statistics and in the choice of prior. Table 7 repeats the analysis summarized in Table 4 , this time with prior probabilities that are uniform in dΩ M dΩ Λ . When so little prior probability is assigned to low values of Ω M , low density Friedmann models do not fare as well. Flat-Λ models with Ω Λ > 0 fare better (59.2% vs. 41.5%) with a uniform prior, not because of a larger prior probability nor because of a higher average likelihood (both actually decrease somewhat relative to the log prior case), but rather because the average likelihood of other models decreases when more weight is given to the high Ω M region of the (Ω M , Ω Λ ) plane. The total posterior probability of all Λ > 0 models is only marginally higher (76.9% vs. 70.2%) than in the log prior case. Thus, our conclusions about the cosmological constant are relatively insensitive to the choice of prior for Ω M . However, the posterior probabilities for the flat and closed models are now significantly larger, 75.1% and 11.1% respectively (compared to 51.5% and 1.5% in the previous analysis), while the odds for the open case are significantly reduced to 13.7% (from 47%). If, as in R98, we were to adopt a uniform prior and limit ourselves to two-parameter models, then after renormalizing the posterior probabilities in Table 7 we would find a 94.3% chance that Λ > 0, comparable to 99.5% in R98. These results are qualitatively consistent with those found from the χ 2 analyses of Podariu & Ratra (2000) , showing that median statistics lead to quite similar (but slightly more conservative) results while relying on fewer hypotheses. Again we would argue that our choice of priors is superior to those chosen in R98 and we have included these last estimates only to show the direct action of the median statistics. That some of these results depend significantly on the choice of prior indicates that better data are needed to convincingly constrain cosmological parameters.
Binomial Constraints on Ω M and Ω Λ from 42 P99 High-z SNe Ia
One nice thing about median statistics is that they are extraordinarily easy to apply. P99 have recently published data on 42 high-z SNe Ia 8 . They have shown plots of the data versus several cosmological models, thus one can read the answer right off their graph of magnitude residuals versus cosmological models (their Figure 2) . We ignore the error bars and simply ask how many data points are below or above each cosmological model line. In other words, we examine how many supernovae are too bright or too faint given a particular cosmological model. The results are given in Table 8 If the number of supernovae too bright is B and the number too faint is F , then according to eq. (1) the relative likelihood of obtaining this result in a given model is proportional to 2 −42 (42!)/(B!F !). Table 8 gives the relative likelihoods normalized to the open model. According to Bayesian statistics our posterior probabilities for each model after examining the P99 data would be proportional to our prior probabilities times the likelihoods in Table 8 . Today our prior probability for the "steady-state" model is near zero since it has no Big Bang and cannot explain the cosmic microwave background. If we restrict attention to open and flat-Λ models we see that even if the Ω M = 1, Ω Λ = 0 model is favored a priori by a factor of 2 because it is a simpler zeroparameter model, it is still strongly ruled out after examining the P99 data because the likelihood for this model in Table 8 is so low.
If a priori we regarded the best-fitting flat-Λ model and the best-fitting open model as equally likely (prior odds of 1 : 1), then after examining the P99 data we should favor the flat-Λ model by odds of 366 : 1. This is an impressive result and does not assume that the errors are Gaussian or that their magnitude is known. It does rely on the assumption that the data points are independent and very importantly that there are no systematic effects. A modest systematic effect in the highredshift supernovae would reverse these odds. The middle panel of Figure 2 in P99 shows that ten SNe Ia lie between the curves for the Ω M = 0.28, Ω Λ = 0.72 and Ω M = 0, Ω Λ = 0 models. The largest magnitude residual between these curves is approximately ∆m = 0.14, thus a systematic shift of −0.14 mag would cause the data to strongly favor the Ω M = 0, Ω Λ = 0 model over the Ω M = 0.28, Ω Λ = 0.72 model with the same odds that now favor the best-fitting flat-Λ model. We emphasize however that we are not suggesting that there is evidence for such a shift in magnitude. The implication of these analyses is clear: the SNe Ia data sets are now large enough to achieve powerful statistical results. Confidence in such results will obtain from more detailed investigation of possible systematic effects.
Constraints on a Time-Variable Cosmological "Constant"
While the restricted one-dimensional models (flat-constant-Λ and open) discussed in the previous two sections are consistent with most recent observations, the flat-constant-Λ model seems to be in conflict with a number of observations, including: (1) analyses of the rate of gravitational lensing of quasars and radio sources by foreground galaxies which require a rather large Ω M ≥ 0.38 at 2 σ in this model (see, e.g., Falco, Kochanek, & Muñoz 1998); and (2) analyses of the number of large arcs formed by strong gravitational lensing by clusters (Bartelmann et al. 1998 , also see Meneghetti et al. 2000; Flores, Maller, & Primack 2000) 9 .
In the near future, measurements of the cosmic microwave background (CMB) anisotropy, thought to be generated by zero-point quantum fluctuations during inflation (see, e.g., Fischler,are tentative and not definitive.
At present, the only consistent model for a time-variable Λ is that which uses a scalar field (φ) with a scalar field potential V (φ) . In this paper we focus on the favored scalar field model in which the potential V (φ) ∝ φ −α , α > 0, at low redshift 10 . A scalar field is mathematically equivalent to a fluid with a timedependent speed of sound (Ratra 1991) . This equivalence may be used to show that a scalar field with potential V (φ) ∝ φ −α , α > 0, acts like a fluid with negative pressure and that the φ energy density behaves like a cosmological constant that decreases with time. We emphasize that in the analysis here we do not make use of the time-independent equation of state fluid approximation to the scalar field model for a time-variable Λ, as has been done in a number of recent papers (see discussion in Podariu & Ratra 2000 ; also see Waga & Frieman 2000) .
The SNe Ia data also place constraints on a time-variable Λ. Here we consider only spatially flat models. For each SN Ia, there is a locus of values of α and Ω M that predict the corrected apparent magnitude. These curves define regions of different likelihood in the α − Ω M plane. Figure 6 shows this plane, with greyscale intensity proportional to the binomial likelihood (eq. [1]) using 16 R98 high-z SNe Ia.
We now compute the posterior odds of the time-variable Λ model versus the time-independent Λ model, allowing only spatially flat cosmologies. The prior odds are set as in Section 6, thus we penalize complicated models by the prior P ∝ (1/2) N +1 where N is the number of parameters. The time-variable Λ model has two parameters, α and Ω M , while the flat-constant-Λ model has but one. Thus the prior odds are 2 : 1 in favor of the constant Λ model before examining the SNe Ia data. We focus on the range 0 ≤ α ≤ 8 since for larger α the time-variable Λ model approaches the Einstein-de Sitter one . For computational simplicity we also focus on the range 0.05 ≤ Ω M ≤ 0.95.
To compare the time-variable Λ model with the flat-constant-Λ model, we compute average likelihoods for α > 0 and α = 0, adopting a uniform prior for both parameters over the ranges 0 ≤ α ≤ 8 and 0.05 ≤ Ω M ≤ 0.95. For the R98 data, the ratio of average likelihoods is 2 : 1 in favor of the constant Λ model, thus the posterior odds are 3.9 : 1. Applying the same analysis to the P99 data, we find that these data favor the constant Λ model by 18 : 1 over the time-variable model. 10 Other potentials have been also considered, e.g., an exponential potential (see, e.g., Lucchin & Matarrese 1985; Ratra 1989; Wetterich 1995; Ferreira & Joyce 1998) , but such models are inconsistent with observational data. A potential ∝ φ −α plays a role in some high energy particle physics models (see, e.g., Masiero & Rosati 1999; Albrecht & Skordis 2000; de la Macorra 1999; Brax & Martin 2000; Choi 1999 ). Discussions of these and related models are given by Steinhardt, Wang, & Zlatev (1999 ), Chiba (1999 , Amendola (1999 ), de Ritis et al. (2000 , Fujii (2000) , Holden & Wands (2000) , Bartolo & Pietroni (2000) , and Barreiro, Copeland, & Nunes (2000) . Ozer (1999) , Waga & Miceli (1999) , Battye, Bucher, & Spergel (1999) , and Bertolami & Martins (1999) discuss other possibilities.
If we adopt logarithmic priors for both α and Ω M (in this case setting a lower bound α > 0.01 to the time-variable model -these results are insensitive to any 0.01 < α min < 0.1), the R98 data favor the constant-Λ model by odds of 1.7 : 1. However, log priors cause the P99 data to favor the time-variable Λ model by 3.6 : 1. The latter occurs because there are several SNe Ia in the P99 data set whose brightnesses would be matched by quite small (but non-zero) values of α and Ω M , so giving larger weight to this region in the α − Ω M plane strongly increases the average likelihood for the time-variable Λ model. The strong dependence of the results on the prior distribution for the parameters indicates that better data are needed to convincingly constrain these parameters.
We also compare the time-variable Λ model to the open one with 0.05 < Ω Λ < 1 and Ω Λ = 0. For the R98 data the posterior odds are 3.2 : 1 and 1.9 : 1 in favor of the time-variable Λ model when we adopt uniform and logarithmic priors, respectively, for α and Ω M . These results motivate further consideration of time-variable Λ models.
Conclusions
Applications of median statistics that we present in this paper demonstrate that statistical independence and freedom from systematic errors are by themselves extremely powerful hypotheses. Perhaps to the surprise of most who survived Freshman Physics laboratory, we find that median statistics leads to strong constraints on models even though this method does not make use of the other two of four assumptions required for standard χ 2 data analysis, those that require Gaussianity and knowledge of the errors. When applied to some of the astronomical data we consider, the median statistics results are dramatic enough to make one question even the first two hypotheses -independence and freedom from systematic error. Median statistics are relatively robust to bad data but when median statistics yield such strong results this could be a warning that the assumptions of independence and freedom from systematics should be carefully examined.
Median statistics analysis of 331 Hubble constant estimates, from Huchra's (1999) compilation, yields a value of H 0 = 67 km s −1 Mpc −1 . This value is quite reasonable and in agreement with many recent estimates, including those obtained from the R98 SNe Ia data that we examine. Based on nearly all available data, this is arguably the best available current summary of our knowledge of the Hubble constant. Such a summary statistic is useful when one needs a consensus value for a cosmological simulation or similar application or, as in the case of the Hayden Planetarium, simply to present a value that is representative of current knowledge (the Planetarium chose H 0 = 70 km s −1 Mpc −1 , Ω M = 1/3, Ω Λ = 2/3, just one significant figure for each constant). The formal, purely statistical 95% confidence interval that results from median statistics, 65 − 69 km s −1 Mpc −1 , is indeed narrow, which highlights the power of our assumptions. If they were truly independent and free of systematics, the extant estimates of H 0 would clearly be numerous enough.
Systematic effects do, of course, dominate the error budget for the Hubble Constant. The vast majority of the published estimates share possible systematic uncertainty through the LMC distance scale and/or calibration of the Cepheid period-luminosity relation (as many as 279 of the 331 could be so affected). We apply median statistics to the distribution of different methods for measuring the LMC distance modulus and find a median value m − M = 18.46 with 95% confidence limits 18.26 < (m − M ) < 18.64. This range of distance moduli implies that the systematic error in our estimate of the median of H 0 could be as large as 7.5% in either direction (95% limits). Grouping the 331 estimates of the Hubble constant by method and applying median statistics to the distribution of methods, we infer that the 95% confidence range of systematic error due to differences between methods is 7% (the median is H 0 = 70 km s −1 Mpc −1 with 95% range 64.5 − 74.5 km s −1 Mpc −1 ). To be conservative, we take the somewhat larger of these two estimates of systematic uncertainty and quote a total error budget on the true median of H 0 of H 0 = 67 ± 2(95% statistical) ± 5(95% systematic) km s −1 Mpc −1 . Thus, systematic errors clearly dominate over the purely statistical errors.
Of some interest is the dependence, or near lack thereof, of median statistics of H 0 on the authors of the papers or the year of publication. Completely excluding all the work of any of the best-known investigators or groups -Sandage, Tammann, and collaborators, de Vaucouleurs or van den Bergh, or the HST Key Project -has at most a 2 km s −1 Mpc −1 effect on the median. The set of estimates attributed to none of these groups has median H 0 = 68 km s −1 Mpc −1 ; this value is also the median of the medians from each group. Recent H 0 estimates (post 1990 or post 1996) differ only slightly from the median of all estimates, shifting the median to H 0 = 65 km s
with confidence limits that include the value estimated from the full data set.
Our analyses of constraints on Ω M and Ω Λ from recently published high-z SNe Ia data from R98 and P99 generally support the conclusions of these groups. Although our results differ in detail, our median statistics prefer the same region in the (Ω M , Ω Λ ) plane as did these earlier analyses. Because we abandon the assumption of Gaussianity, the statistical power of our results is somewhat smaller. If the assumption of Gaussianity is valid, then somewhat stronger constraints (with confidence similar to limits found by R98 and P99) could be obtained but these would not be identical to those of R98 and P99 because we assume a different prior.
In agreement with R98 and P99, the Ω M = 1 Einstein-de Sitter model is strongly ruled out. The reason for this strong result is simply that the majority of the SNe Ia are too faint for the model. Using only the binomial likelihoods that the observed SNe Ia are too bright/faint for a given model, we find that the 16 R98 high-z SNe Ia rule out the Einstein-de Sitter model at the 99.6% confidence level. A similar analysis rules out Ω Λ = 0 models at 89%.
We apply a more complete Bayesian treatment to the 16 R98 SNe Ia, including appropriate priors for Ω M and Ω Λ , and for models with varying numbers of free parameters. The posterior probability that Λ > 0 is between 70 and 89%, depending on how we bound the parameter space using prior information (compare Tables 4 and 6 ). The posterior probability of an open universe is about 47% and the probability of a flat universe is either 51 or 38%. These results differ in detail from those of R98 (and a similar conclusion holds for the results of P99), whose analysis used a uniform prior for Ω M and made no allowance for the zero-or one-parameter models. The constraints on Ω Λ are not sensitive to our use of a logarithmic prior for Ω M , although the uniform prior does strongly discriminate against low Ω M models and significantly increases the odds of a flat model over an open one (also see Podariu and Ratra 2000) .
To determine the significance of constraints on Ω M and Ω Λ from a larger data set, we apply median statistics to the 42 high-z SNe Ia reported by P99. Here we simply count the number of SNe Ia that lie brighter/fainter than predicted by different models and compute the binomial likelihoods of these events That we can achieve such dramatic constraints from median statistics alone indicates that it might be wise to carefully examine the possible effects of systematic errors. Although we do not mean to suggest that there is evidence for such an effect, we caution that a systematic shift of only 0.14 mag would reverse these odds.
Using similar techniques, we use the SNe Ia to evaluate the posterior probabilities of a timevariable cosmological "constant" compared to a flat-constant-Λ model. Using uniform priors for the distribution of the parameters α and Ω M , the R98 and P99 data favor the constant Λ model over the time-variable Λ one by posterior odds of 3.9 : 1 and 18 : 1, respectively. If we adopt logarithmic priors for the parameters, the R98 data favor the constant Λ model by somewhat smaller odds, 1.7 : 1, but the P99 data actually favor a time-variable Λ by 3.6 : 1. Similar analysis shows that the R98 data mildly favors a time-variable Λ model over an open universe with Λ = 0, by posterior odds 3.2 : 1 or 1.9 : 1 assuming uniform or logarithmic priors, respectively, on α and Ω M . We conclude that the data in hand are not good enough to convincingly constrain these parameters.
Given the simplicity of median statistics and their freedom from the sometimes-questionable assumption of Gaussianity, we find it surprising that such methods have not been applied more frequently. At the very least, this approach is useful for early analyses of data sets, before one has gathered the evidence to justify methods that require stronger hypotheses. As our examples illustrate, when applied even to larger data sets, median statistics provide a check on more complicated methods. When the results of median statistics seem questionable, analyses that rely on a larger number of assumptions are likely to be even more in doubt. We suggest that one follow the advice of Zeldovich. Take the median! We acknowledge valuable discussions with I. Wasserman. We thank J. Huchra for his compilation of Hubble constant estimates and R. Marcialis for providing the Pluto-Charon data. We are indebted to the referee, B. Gibson, for detailed comments which helped improved the paper. We also thank C. Dudley, A. Gould, A. Riess and L. Weaver for helpful comments on the manuscript. JRG acknowledges support from NSF grant AST-9900772. MSV acknowledges support from the AAS Small Research Grant program, from John Templeton Foundation grant 938-COS302, and with 95% (2 σ) statistical confidence interval of 65 − 69 km s −1 Mpc −1 , computed using the integral over the tails of the binomial probability distribution. Systematic uncertainty is approximately ±5 km s −1 Mpc −1 (95% limits). Figure 3 , the greyscale intensity at each point in the (Ω M , Ω Λ ) plane is set proportional to the binomial likelihood of the observed number of supernovae being brighter/fainter than expected for that model. Conventions, including definitions of dot-, long-, and short-dashed curves, are as described in the caption of Figure 3 . The solid lines are 1, 2, and 3 σ likelihood contours computed using a χ 2 analysis similar to that used by R98 (see Podariu & Ratra 2000) . In Figure 4a the likelihood is set to zero in the "No Big Bang" region. The solid lines are 1, 2, and 3 σ confidence contours computed using a χ 2 analysis (Podariu & Ratra 2000) ; the first curve in the lower left-hand corner is a 2 σ contour and one of the 1 σ contours is obscured by the shading.
